RESUMENLa teoría agustiniana del conocimiento supone una síntesis de tres funciones fundamentales de la mente: la intuición intelectual, la intuición sensitiva y la razón discursiva, que aplica a las intuiciones sensibles los principios que la intuición intelectual nos suministra, con lo que alcnzamos un auténtico conocimiento humano, en el que se aúnan la razón discursiva y la razón intuitiva, síntesis a la que Agustín denomina razón superior, gracias a la cual superamos el simple conocimiento animal.PALABRAS CLAVESAN AGUSTÍN-EPISTEMOLOGIA-RAZONABSTRACTSaint Augustine's epistemology entails (...) a synthesis of the mind's three main functions: intellectual intuition, sensitive intuition and discursive reason. It applies to sensible intuitions the principles provided by the intellectual intuition. That way, we reach a genuine human knowledge, where discursive reason and intuitive reason converge: a synthesis called higher reason by augustine. Because of it, we overcome the mere animal knowledge. KEYWORDSSAINT AUGUSTINE-EPISTEMOLOGY-REASON. (shrink)

RESUMENMaría Zambrano intenta superar el racionalismo a partir de la razón poética, síntesis de la intuición intelectual, que llama “revelación”, y de la razón discursiva.PALABRAS CLAVESRAZON POETICA – INTUICION – REFLEXION – RACIONALISMO ABSTRACTMaría Zambrano tries to go beyond rationalism from the “poetic reason”, a synthesis of the intelectual intuition, which she calls “revelation”, and the discursive reason.KEYWORDSPOETIC REASON – INTUITION – REFLECTION – RATIONALISM.

La normalización de la precariedad entre las personas jóvenes está entrando en lo que parece una nueva fase. De la mano de, entre otros factores, los discursos empresariales y la teoría del capital humano, estamos asistiendo a una vuelta de tuerca en la presión sobre la juventud: ya no basta con la búsqueda «activa» de empleo, ahora hay que invertir en uno mismo como «empresario de sí mismo» y, en esta lógica, si es preciso hay que optar por la «movilidad (...) internacional». Presentamos una revisión teórica y conceptual alrededor de lo que se conoce como fuga de cerebros y su justificación discursiva. Estamos ante un proceso que probablemente dejará una marca importante en una generación que ha visto truncadas sus posibilidades de transición a situaciones estables, idealmente identificadas con el mundo adulto.Normalization of precariousness among young people is entering in a new phase. Led by, among other factors, the human capital theory, we are witnessing a twist in pressure on young people: it is no longer enough with «active» job search, now you have to invest in yourself as entrepreneur of yourself’ and in this logic, maybe young people must choose for the «international mobility», which is represented as a cosmopolitan option. We present a theoretical and conceptual review around what is known as brain drain and its discursive justification. We are facing a process that will probably leave a significant mark on a generation whose chances of transition to stable situations have been truncated, ideally identified with the adult world. (shrink)

Employees at healthcare organizations are experiencing more stress than ever given the current COVID-19 pandemic. Different types of stress are affecting diverse organizational outcomes, including the employees’ voluntary turnover. This is the case of cognitive stress, a type of stress that affects how individuals process information, which can influence employees’ turnover intentions. In this study, we look at the mechanisms that can reduce the adverse effects of cognitive stress on turnover intentions, particularly the role of employees’ perceived psychological safety. We (...) hypothesize that psychological safety mediates the relationship between cognitive stress and turnover intentions, and COVID-19 worry and supervisor support moderate the relationship between cognitive stress and psychological safety. To test our hypothesis, we invited two public health care organizations in Chile to join this study. In total, we obtained a sample of 146 employees in 21 different teams. Using a multilevel model, we found that psychological safety prevents the harmful effects of cognitive stress on employees’ turnover intentions. In addition, while COVID-19 worry can worsen the relationship between cognitive stress and psychological safety, supervisor support only directly affects psychological safety. This study contributes to expanding the stress and psychological safety literature and informs practitioners in healthcare organizations about how to deal with cognitive stress in the “new normality” that the pandemic has brought. (shrink)

En los últimos treinta años se ha transitado desde una concepción del capital humano como una macromagnitud económica a una idea de capital humano corporeizada en el individuo. Hemos asistido a una progresiva infiltración de dicha ideología del capital humano también en la vida de la juventud precaria. Nos centramos aquí en los jóvenes universitarios, para quienes el capital humano, ya de forma hegemónica, dirige y marca sus recorridos laborales y vitales. El análisis de los discursos de estos jóvenes nos (...) permitirá explorar desde la imposición de la lógica de la movilidad laboral, a la sujeción a las formas de "emprendedor de sí mismo" y a la normalización, como parte del proceso de incorporación de capital humano, de formas de empleo progresivamente al margen de los derechos y garantías laborales clásicas del trabajo salariado.In the last thirty years it has been gone from a conception of the human capital as an economic macro magnitude to an idea of human capital embodied in the individuals. We have been witnesses of the progressive infiltration of this ideology of the human capital also in the life of precarious youth. We focus in the university young people, for those who the human capital, already of hegemonic form, directs and marks its labour and vital routes. The analysis of the discourses of these young people will allow us to explore the imposition of the logic of labour mobility, the subjection to the forms of «entrepreneur of itself» and also the normalization of forms of work progressively excluded from the rights and classic labour guarantees as a part of the process of incorporation of human capital. (shrink)

Texto introductorio y de presentación del número monográfico.

The guide for the Perplexed is one of the most interesting books of the Medieval Philosophie. It is saturated of Arabic culture and it takes root in the intelectual and religious tradition of the Judaism.

Presento la trascendencia de la neurociencia para el estudio de la relación entre determinismo y libre albedrío. Diversos trabajos vinculan la actividad de ciertas áreas nerviosas con el desempeño de las funciones volitivas, el trabajo de Benjamin Libet y de Daniel Wegner otorga gran importancia al inconsciente en nuestros actos, y hay pruebas de influencia causal del entorno sociocultural sobre el cerebro del individuo. Todo esto sugiere una concepción determinista de nuestra voluntad, pero sostengo que ni esta ni la indeterminista (...) están claras actualmente y que se debe profundizar en la neuroplasticidad, las decisiones distales y la deliberación. (shrink)

The current training model being used in higher education advocates the acquisition of competences aimed at providing students with all-round training that will enable them to tackle their future work responsibilities effectively. This encompasses a number of different competences, most notably the transversal kind, especially in view of the important role they play in shaping the profile of any professional individual. The active learning methods applied to group work have shown to be the most suitable for achieving these competences. From (...) this perspective, and considering their relevance, we present the results of a study that addresses the perceptions held by students from Education Degrees regarding the extent to which transversal competences are acquired by implementing active learning methods. The students perceive group work as a dynamic that teaches them how to be more self-critical and committed to group-oriented tasks, thus encouraging communication skills, personal relationships and motivation. However, a lesser degree of acquisition has been recorded in other equally important competences. As such, it is necessary to promote these learning methods from the start, carefully designing and planning the curriculum structure as well as the tasks to be performed in order to avoid any negative implications that may arise. (shrink)

This essay examines photographic representations of queer Latinidad. A longing to discover a photographic history of Latina lesbian desire prompts a discussion of queerness in the context of Latinx love, sexuality, and desire. By way of examples of photographic representations, queer Latinidad is presented as complex and capable of encompassing paradoxical but expansive, nondichotomous understandings of sexuality and of gender presentation. Such photographic representations also allow for disidentifications that introduce the possibility of desires that cut across races and racism. Following (...) Muñoz, queer Latinidad is ultimately connected to a sense of longing and melancholia that is resistant in the face of the various erasures of queer Latinidad, both in the context of queer theory and in the context of everydayness. (shrink)

Supererogatory acts are those that lie “beyond the call of duty.” There are two standard ways to define this idea more precisely. Although the definitions are often seen as equivalent, I argue that they can diverge when options are infinite, or when there are cycles of better options; moreover, each definition is acceptable in only one case. I consider two ways out of this dilemma.

Supererogatory acts—good deeds “beyond the call of duty”—are a part of moral common sense, but conceptually puzzling. I propose a unified solution to three of the most infamous puzzles: the classic Paradox of Supererogation (if it’s so good, why isn’t it just obligatory?), Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, and Kamm’s Intransitivity Paradox. I conclude that supererogation makes sense if, and only if, the grounds of rightness are multi-dimensional and comparative.

José Ortega y Gasset publicó en 1939, en la colección Austral, este ensayo filosófico que obtuvo una gran repercusión internacional en su día y sigue siendo en la actualidad una de las obras clave del pensamiento orteguiano. Esta edición conmemora los setenta años transcurridos desde entonces y ofrece la única edición autorizada y revisada personalmente por el autor.

Moral philosophy is often said to be about what we owe to each other. Do we owe anything to ourselves?

Consequentialists say we may always promote the good. Deontologists object: not if that means killing one to save five. “Consequentializers” reply: this act is wrong, but it is not for the best, since killing is worse than letting die. I argue that this reply undercuts the “compellingness” of consequentialism, which comes from an outcome-based view of action that collapses the distinction between killing and letting die.

In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong. This case shows that the subjective and objective ‘oughts’ are somewhat independent. But there remains a powerful intuition that the guidance of objective ‘oughts’ is more authoritative—so long as we know what they tell us. We argue that this intuition must be given up in light of a monotonicity principle, which undercuts the rationale for saying that objective ‘oughts’ are an authoritative guide for (...) agents and advisors. (shrink)

Contingent negative existentials give rise to a notorious paradox. I formulate a version in terms of metaphysical grounding: nonexistence can't be fundamental, but nothing can ground it. I then argue for a new kind of solution, expanding on work by Kit Fine. The key idea is that negative existentials are contingently zero-grounded – that is to say, they are grounded, but not by anything, and only in the right conditions. If this is correct, it follows that grounding cannot be an (...) internal relation, and that no complete account of reality can be purely fundamental. (shrink)

Some sacrifices—like giving a kidney or heroically dashing into a burning building—are supererogatory: they are good deeds beyond the call of duty. But if such deeds are really so good, philosophers ask, why shouldn’t morality just require them? The standard answer is that morality recognizes a special role for the pursuit of self-interest, so that everyone may treat themselves as if they were uniquely important. This idea, however, cannot be reconciled with the compelling picture of morality as impartial—the view that (...) we are each anyone’s equal. I propose an alternative Self-Other Symmetric account of our moral freedom: the limits on what morality may demand of us are set by the duties we owe to ourselves. I begin with a defense of the Self-Other Symmetry: the idea that we owe the same duties to ourselves—and have the same rights against ourselves—as any relevantly similar other. Because we are consenting parties to our own actions, I argue, our rights against ourselves do not function like the rights of unwilling others. Instead, they play a permissive function, allowing us to block the demand to give up what is ours. I conclude by uniting, aggravating, and trying to solve some paradoxes of supererogatory permissions, guided by the idea that morality cannot be reduced to a ranking of options from best-to-worst. Rights against oneself are an irreducible second dimension, one that we need if we are to unify rights and supererogation into an impartial moral vision. (shrink)

According to a familiar (alleged) requirement on practical reason, one must believe a proposition if one is to take it for granted in reasoning about what to do. This paper explores a related requirement, not on thinking but on acting—that one must accept a goal if one is to count as acting for its sake. This is the acceptance requirement. Although it is endorsed by writers as diverse as Christine Korsgaard, Donald Davidson, and Talbot Brewer, I argue that it is (...) vulnerable to counterexamples, in which agents act in light of ends that they do not accept but are still merely considering. For instance, a young professional may keep a job option open not because she definitely wants or intends to take it, but just because she is considering taking it. I try to show that such examples are not easily resisted; that they present challenges specifically for Brewer, Davidson, and especially Korsgaard; and that the examples also raise fresh, non-partisan questions in action theory. What is considering, exactly? How could it fall short of acceptance while still guiding behaviour? How can we act for an end before thinking it through? (shrink)